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A Changing Federal-State
Balance in Unemployment
Insurance?
U

nemployment insurance (UI)
provides temporary partial wage
replacement to involuntarily jobless
workers who are strongly attached to the
labor force. The federal-state UI system
was established by the Social Security
Act of 1935 during the Great Depression.
Despite the severity of the long-term
unemployment problem at the time,
the UI program started modestly. The
original aims were to alleviate hardship
during temporary periods of joblessness,
maintain aggregate purchasing power
during economic downturns, preserve
employer-employee relationships, and
prevent descent into poverty. States’
reluctance to establish programs was
overcome by the incentive of a federal
tax with a 90 percent credit to states
operating conforming UI programs.
Through its benefit and financing
mechanisms, UI is an automatic stabilizer
for the economy. In recessions spending
is injected through benefits, and benefit
disbursements decline in recoveries.
Through the forward funding principle,
states accumulate reserves during
economic expansions and draw them
down during recessions. The UI program
has served well its core aims over the
years, but the federal-state balance of
responsibilities is changing, and current
trends in funding and benefit duration
threaten the countercyclical strength of
state programs.

Yang, Lasky, and Page (2010) of the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
rated UI as the best of 11 possible
countercyclical policy measures because
of its timeliness, strength, and temporary
nature. Besides replacing lost earnings
to households, they estimate UI job
creation strength to be between two and
five times that of infrastructure spending.
During the recent Great Recession, UI
was particularly important in alleviating
hardship and serving as a countercyclical
mechanism. Acs and Dahl (2010, p. 8)
of the CBO estimated that “in 2009, the
poverty rate was 14.3 percent. Without
UI benefits, it would have been 15.4
percent.”
In 2009 states paid $79 billion in
regular UI benefits, while the federal
government provided $49.2 billion in
emergency and extended benefits. The
federal support included the full $6.1
billion cost of benefits paid through the
permanent federal-state extended benefits
program that is normally financed 50-50
together with the states. Despite federal
largess, the Great Recession exhausted
the majority of state accounts in the
Unemployment Trust Fund. Many states
had not accumulated adequate reserves
before the downturn and were forced to
borrow from the Federal Unemployment
Account. Figure 1 shows the federal
shares of total UI benefit payments in
years around recessions dating back to
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Figure 1 Federal Shares of Total Unemployment Insurance Benefit Costs in
Recession Years
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SOURCE: http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/hb394.asp (accessed January 14, 2013).

1958. The federal shares in the past three
years were enormous, reaching 55.7
percent in 2011.
The UI system was designed to be
self-financing and started with a strong
financial foundation having relatively
high tax rates and modest benefits. The
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)
in 1939 set the total tax rate at 3 percent
on the first $3,000 earned by each
employee—the same as Social Security
at the time. A 90 percent FUTA credit
meant a tax rate of 2.7 percent paid into
state reserve accounts for benefits, with
0.3 percent paid into federal accounts for
program administration, loan reserves,
and employment services. In 1939, most
states paid weekly benefits equal to half
the weekly wage up to a maximum of
$15 for up to 16 weeks. Some offered
as many as 26 weeks (Table 1). It was

common at that time for states to require
waiting periods between 2 and 4 weeks
as a type of insurance copayment covered
by the worker.
After World War II, reserves
accumulated and benefits improved.
Sufficient forward funding of benefits
permitted development of state financing
systems that recovered charges three
to five years after payment when the
economy was again in the expansion
phase. By the late 1950s nearly all
states provided up to 26 weeks of
compensation. In 1959, one waiting week
was standard in all but five states. In
the 1960s, system reserves continued to
rise and 26 weeks became the minimum
potential compensable duration in all
states.
As social insurance, UI does not
replace all lost wages. Instead, wage

Table 1 Benefit and Tax Parameters of State Unemployment Insurance Systems
over Time
Max weeks
Waiting weeks Taxable wages ($) Average tax rates (%)
Year
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Total
Taxable
1939
13
26
2
4
3,000
3,000
2.66
2.72
1959
18
34
0
1
3,000
4,200
1.06
1.71
1979
26
39
0
1
6,000
11,200
1.26
2.67
1999
26
30
0
1
7,000
27,500
0.56
1.77
2012
20
30
0
1
7,000
38,800
0.90
3.40
SOURCE: http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp (accessed January 14, 2013).
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replacement aims to cover most
nondeferrable expenses for a median
household. Various strands of research
all find the optimal replacement rate at
about 50 percent of lost wages. That
rate is said to balance socially adequate
income replacement against possible
work disincentives. Research also
suggests that the common practice of
a fixed weekly benefit amount for up
to 26 weeks during joblessness would
tend to overcompensate short spells
and undercompensate long spells
of unemployment (O’Leary 1998).
Recessions starting after the first OPEC
oil embargo in 1973 put a severe strain on
state UI financing systems. Actions and
inactions by the state and federal partners
in response to successive crises over the
years have tipped the balance toward a
larger federal role in the system.
To earn their FUTA credit, states are
required to experience rate taxes paid
by employers based on their UI benefit
charges, and to have taxable wage bases
at least as high as the FUTA level. The
FUTA tax base has been increased
only three times: to $4,200 in 1972,
to $6,000 in 1978, and to the current
level of $7,000 in 1983 by President
Reagan. That current level is only 6.2
percent of the $113,700 taxable wage
base for Social Security. Since many
states set their maximum taxable wage
base at or near the FUTA level, the
average tax on total payrolls has declined
dramatically, and states often strain to
cover ineffective charges to employers
perpetually stuck at the maximum tax
rate. Such employers have benefit charges
exceeding contributions every year, and
are subsidized by employers whose taxes
vary within the limits of the tax rate
range. Thirty-five states currently have UI
taxable wage bases at or below $15,000.
The recessions of 1975, 1980, and
1982 resulted in significant levels of
borrowing by states to pay UI benefits,
and the share of unemployed receiving
UI continued a downward trend through
the early 1980s. Federal actions to
raise triggers for the extended benefits,
and state actions to tighten eligibility
requirements and enforce active job
search all curtailed recipiency. After
the industrial restructuring and massive
permanent worker displacements in the
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1980s, both voluntary and involuntary
part-time work expanded. Pressure to
provide UI access for these workers
restrained increases in UI earnings
requirements, and this policy posture was
activated through incentives provided
for UI modernization in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
However, the scale of state UI borrowing
in the Great Recession forced states to
undertake dramatic UI program reforms.
In 2011, interest payments were made
on loans by 29 state UI programs. By
2012, there remained 19 state programs
with loans outstanding for at least two
consecutive years. Those states were
subject to FUTA credit reductions ranging
from 0.3 to 1.5 percentage points. Rather
than enacting reforms to enhance UI
fiscal integrity, many states have accepted
the FUTA credit reductions that rise by
0.3 percentage points per year until the
outstanding loans are paid off. A problem
with this strategy occurs after the loan is
paid off—the offset falls to zero and the
conditions causing the shortfall remain
unchanged.
Five states adopted UI reforms in
2010; of these, four states raised their
taxable wage bases, and two enacted
benefit reductions. In 2011, six states
enacted UI program changes emphasizing
reduced benefit entitlement; all six cut
their maximum potential durations of
benefits to 23 or fewer weeks (Vroman
2011). These actions were probably
influenced by the federal benefits
extension for 2011 that prohibited
reductions in weekly benefits but did not
address durations. It has been more than
60 years since potential durations have
been less than 26 weeks in any state. In
2012, Georgia implemented a system
with maximum potential duration up to
20 weeks if unemployment is 9.0 percent
or higher, with the maximum falling by
1 week for each 0.5 percentage point
drop in the state total unemployment
rate reaching a minimum of 14 weeks if
unemployment is 6.5 percent or lower.
Preliminary data from a proposed
federal Employment and Training
Administration report on the actual
quarterly distributions of UI benefit
receipt are used to shed light on the
effects of shorter potential durations.
In a representative state, with variable
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entitled duration, an average of 43.0
percent of beneficiaries exhausted the
26-week maximum entitlements between
2006 and 2011. Each of the benefit
durations between 25 and 10 weeks
were experienced by 3–4 percent of the
beneficiaries, and a total of 1 percent
had durations less than 10 weeks. Using
an econometric benefit financing model,
we simulated the effect on total UI
payments under the assumption that state
unemployment gradually declines from
9.5 percent in 2012 to 5.8 percent in
2021. Adopting the declining maximum
duration feature alone, annual UI benefit
payments will be 39 percent lower in
2021. We also simulated the effect of this
change together with two others: 1) fixing
the maximum weekly benefit amount at
70 percent of its current dollar level; and
2) changing the benefit formula from
being based on the high quarter only to
the two most recent quarters—which
includes the Ashenfelter income dip for
displaced workers. This second bundle
of changes is simulated to produce UI
benefit payments 67 percent lower in
2021 than would result under the current
system (Figure 2). Such packages of
benefit changes dramatically reduce

the alleviation of hardship caused by
unemployment, and seriously weaken the
countercyclical strength of UI benefits.
The UI system served an important
stabilizing function for the economy
during the recent deep and protracted
recession. However, federal action and
state responses to accumulated debt
threaten the countercyclical strength
of the federal-state system. Reforms
proposed by the White House and the
Senate to raise the FUTA wage limit to
$15,000 would broaden the tax base in
the majority of states and should improve
forward funding of the system. A House
proposal to federally pay about $31
billion in state debts would reinforce
current trends of declining state fiscal
preparedness. Rather than focusing
mainly on reduced benefit provisions to
address fiscal difficulties, states should
adopt balanced packages of revenue and
benefit reforms. In addition to raising the
FUTA tax base, the federal partner should
institute minimum standards on weekly
benefit levels and durations, and also tie
potential durations of any future federal
emergency benefits to the existing state
maximum durations. For example, a state
providing up to 26 weeks would get 13

Figure 2 Projected Benefit Payments under Existing and Alternative Declining
Duration UI Systems ($, millions)
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weeks of federal temporary benefits, but
if the state maximum were 20 weeks the
federal supplement would be 10 weeks.
A much neglected potential reform
on the benefit side would be to institute
waiting periods of 2–4 weeks, with the
duration of the wait depending inversely
on the aggregate level of unemployment.
Current UI take-up rates among the
eligible unemployed range from 60 to
80 percent depending on job market
conditions. A somewhat longer waiting
period will reduce program entry by
those with ready reemployment options,
and help to preserve the income security
strength of the system for those who are
involuntarily jobless for 4, 5, or 6 months.
This approach could help preserve benefit
adequacy while fiscal reforms broaden the
tax base and range of rates to restore the
experience rating principle. Better cost
recovery of benefit charges will assure
that final prices of goods and services
more properly reflect the full cost of
unemployment risk in their production.
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Economic and Psychological
Consequences of LongTerm Unemployment
O

n April 1–2, 2011, the UCLA
Institute for Research on Labor and
Employment (IRLE) hosted an Upjohn
Institute–sponsored conference on longterm unemployment, its causes and
consequences, and policies to mitigate it.
With a loss of 7.9 million jobs from the
start of the Great Recession in December
2007 until jobs started to consistently
increase in October 2010 (Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2013a), the recession
of 2007–2009 resulted in far greater job
losses in the United States than any other
recession in recent history. Thus, the
conference, with participants from the
United States, Canada, and Europe, was
held in response to the jobs crisis that
began with and followed from the Great
Recession in the United States and the
severe economic downturn felt around
the world.
The UCLA-IRLE conference was
held 21 months after the recovery from
the Great Recession had begun, and
the United States was still mired in a
severe jobs crisis, having created only
1.1 million jobs during the 21 months
from July 2009 through March 2011.
While this job growth was welcomed,
it did little to alleviate unemployment,
as it would have taken the creation of
more than 2 million jobs in this time
period merely to keep up with the
growth in the working age population. In
addition, in March 2011, the month prior
to the conference, 8.4 million workers
were working part time when they
wanted to have full-time positions. The
unemployment rate was 8.8 percent, and
45.5 percent of the unemployed found
themselves out of work for 6 months or
more. One-third of the unemployed had
been looking for work for at least one
year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013a,b).
The book Reconnecting to Work:
Policies to Mitigate Long-Term

Unemployment and Its Consequences,
published recently by the Upjohn
Institute, is based on the proceedings
of the 2011 conference. Although the
employment situation in the United
States has since improved somewhat,
with unemployment dropping to below
8 percent in September 2012 for the first
time since January 2009, this book is
still all too relevant (Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2013b). The jobs deficit is
worse and jobs recovery slower following
the Great Recession than in the five
preceding recessions (see Figure 1).
While the unemployment rate has in
fact declined, the country still faces a
jobs deficit of 4 million compared with
the number of jobs in the economy in
December 2007 (plus more than 5 million
jobs that should have been created
since the start of the recession to keep
up with the growth in the working age
population). The rate of job growth has
been increasing, but not fast enough—at
the current rate, it will take until the next
decade to alleviate the jobs deficit created
by the recession (Baker 2013). Moreover,
despite the recent improvement in
the unemployment rate, the broader
measure of unemployment that includes
individuals working part time for
economic reasons and those who are
only marginally attached to the labor
force has remained much higher—14.4
percent in December 2012. Also in
that month, there were 7.9 million
people who were working part-time for
economic reasons. While there were
500,000 fewer involuntary part-time
workers in December 2012 than when
the conference was held in April 2011,
there were still 3.3 million more of
these workers that month than when
the recession began in December 2007.
Furthermore, long-term unemployment
remains a serious problem in the United

